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We compare the forecasts of nineteen movie box office results from real money (Iowa Electronic
Market) and play money (Hollywood Stock Exchange) prediction markets. The forecasts were not
significantly different, contrary to recent research on incentives and prediction market accuracy.
Proponents of play money incentives suggest that (play) wealth concentrates in the hands of
knowledgeable traders over time. This should lead to improved accuracy over time. A longitudinal
analysis of results (1999–2002) from the play money Hollywood Stock Exchange fails to find
significant improvement over time. This may be due to an increased number of less knowledgeable
traders who, nevertheless, provide liquidity in the market.
1. INTRODUCTION
Prediction markets are exchanges in which traders buy and sell securities
whose value will be determined by an uncertain future event. Organizers of
prediction markets use a market mechanism to aggregate the information
available to individual traders. Individuals with superior information about
the likelihood of future events benefit from trading with others who have less
accurate information (Plott and Sunder 1982). Through these interactions and
the resulting prices in the market, participants and observers gain access to a
distillation of a wide variety of public and private sources of information
(Plott 2000). The resulting market prices have provided accurate forecasts
of future events in a number of applications including political elections
(Forsythe, et al. 1992), sporting events (Servan-Schreiber, et al. 2004) and
movie awards (Pennock, et al. 2000). The ability of prediction markets to
provide accurate forecasts of future events has sparked a great deal of interest
from organizations hoping to harness the “wisdom of the crowd” (Surowiecki,
2004).
In their review of election prediction markets, Forsythe, et al. (1999)
conclude that accurate forecasts would come from markets comprised of
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“a large panel of motivated, interested experts,” rather than a representative
sample of voters. The interactive technology of the Internet allows one to
convene such panels of interested experts anytime and anywhere. The key
question is: How do we motivate traders to share potentially valuable
information? It would seem straightforward that monetary incentives would
be necessary to motivate the participation of traders with valuable
information. This assertion is supported by a stream of experimental studies
beginning with Siegel (1961). This laboratory-based research shows the
benefits of providing monetary incentives in experiments where participants
are expected to maximize utility. In prediction markets, tying a trader’s
financial outcome to his or her accuracy should provide an incentive to
truthfully reveal one’s valuable information.
However, organizing prediction markets using real money payoffs raises a
number of regulatory and organizational challenges. Depending on the subject
of the prediction market, a prediction market may run afoul of laws governing
gambling, securities trading, or futures contracts. Furthermore, while Internet
technology allows a prediction market organizer to recruit participants
globally, the laws and regulations pertaining to gambling and/or financial
markets often conflict across jurisdictions. A clear illustration may be found in
the prosecution of BETonSports.com, a UK-based betting business which has
pleaded guilty to violating U.S. anti-gambling laws (Wall Street Journal, 2007).
The alternative of using play money avoids many of these complications.
Furthermore, research on prediction markets to forecast movie box office
results suggests that play money markets can provide more accurate results
than individual forecasters (Pennock, et al. 2000; 2001; Spann and Skiera
2003). A study by Servan-Schreiber, et al. (2004) compared the ability of a real
money prediction market (Tradesports) with a play money prediction market
(Newsfutures) to predict the outcome of NFL games in 2003. Using various
measures of forecasting accuracy (e.g. mean absolute error), the authors found
no statistical differences between the results for the real money and play money
prediction markets. A subsequent study by Rosenbloom and Notz (2005) found
that real money markets were significantly more accurate than play money
markets in predicting the daily direction (up or down) of the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA). They found no statistically significant differences
in accuracy when the subject was team sports in North America (baseball,
basketball and hockey). However, for a small set of other events (tennis
matches, golf, political events, etc.), the forecasts of the real money markets
were significantly more accurate than those of the play money counterpart.
To explain these results, Rosenbloom and Notz (2005) offer two
interesting explanations. The first is that traders in both real and play money
markets have ready access to betting odds for sporting events from sports book
makers and Las Vegas casinos. This publicly available information can help
traders in both types of prediction markets make accurate forecasts of the
outcome of a sports contest. This leads to there being no difference in
accuracy between the real and play money markets. In contrast, this type of
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public information is less likely to be available for non-sports events.
Consequently, better informed traders seek out real money prediction markets
for non-sports events in order to profit from their superior knowledge. This
results in real money markets providing better forecasts for non-sports events.
Given the barriers to organizing real money markets, it is important to
determine whether the results obtained by Rosenbloom and Notz (2005)
generalize to other, non-sports events.
Their second explanation suggests the accuracy of a play money market
suffers due to the retention of losers in the trading population. In real money
markets, they argue, losing traders eventually run out of money and cease to
participate. The resulting trading is a contest between the best informed
traders. This is an interesting conjecture since Servan-Schreiber, et al. (2004)
advance essentially the same line of reasoning in arguing for the potential
superiority of play money prediction markets. In real money markets, the
influence of a given trader’s opinion on market prices is based, in part, by the
amount of money the trader is willing to risk. This is one reason that the real
money Iowa Electronic Market limits trader accounts to $500. In play money
markets, in contrast, the only way to increase one’s (play) wealth is to have
a history of successful trades, presumably the result of having accurate
information about the subject of the prediction market. If this latter view of
play money prediction markets were true, we would expect that the accuracy
of its forecasts would improve over time as the (play) wealth of the market
becomes concentrated in the hands of the better informed traders.
In this study, we consider these two issues by examining the forecasting
abilities of both real money and play money prediction markets for movie box
office revenues. The play money market is the Hollywood Stock Exchange
(HSX), which has been the subject of prior research on forecasting accuracy
(Pennock, et al. 2000; 2001; Spann and Skiera 2003). The real money market
is the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM), which is best known for its election
prediction markets (Berg, et al. 2007). The IEM has been organizing
prediction markets to forecast movie box office results since the fall of
1995 (Gruca 2000).
To determine whether monetary incentives improve the accuracy of
forecasts of movie box office revenues, we compared the outcomes from 19
matched prediction markets associated with movies released between 1998
and 2007. We find that the point estimates provided by the two markets have
comparable levels of accuracy. Contrary to prior research, we found no
statistically significant difference between the accuracies of the real and play
money markets for these non-sports events.
To determine whether play money markets retain losers which would
reduce forecasting accuracy over time (Rosenbloom and Notz 2005) or play
money markets concentrate wealth in the hands of highly informed traders
(Servan-Schreiber, et al. 2004), we analyzed the forecasting performance of
the Hollywood Stock Exchange over a 4 year period (1999–2002). This
sample of 500þ movies incorporates all of the observations in the prior
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research by Pennock, et al. (2000; 2001) and Spann and Skiera (2003). We
find no significant improvement in the average predictive accuracy over time.
We offer an explanation for these findings that has potentially important
implications for play money market operators.
In the next section, we briefly describe the Hollywood Stock Exchange
followed by a description of the IEM Movie Box Office Markets. We follow
by presenting a comparison of the forecasts from these two prediction
markets. We then report on our multi-year analysis of the forecasting accuracy
of the play money Hollywood Stock Exchange. The paper closes with a
discussion of our results and directions for future research.
2. PREDICTION MARKET DESCRIPTIONS
2.1 Hollywood stock exchange
Operating since April 1996, “The Hollywood Stock Exchange,” or
HSX.com is an Internet-based game. Every new player is provided a fund of
$2 million fictitious HSX dollars (or H$). The goal of the game is to acquire
more HSX dollars through the trading of entertainment related securities. The
value of these securities is tied to entertainment events including movie box
office performance, awards shows, etc. There are more than one and a half
million registered participants in the HSX.com game. In March of 2001, a new
venture called hsxresearch.com was launched to provide data from HSX.com
to movie and other entertainment companies. Its predictions are discussed in
major publications such as Advertising Age and syndicated to other
entertainment-related outlets in traditional (off-line) media.
The focus of this study is the “Movie Stock” security whose value is based
on a movie’s total domestic U.S. box office after the first 4 weekends of wide
release (650þ screens). For example, if traders (as a group) expect a movie to
take in $75 million during that time period, the price for the Movie Stock will
be H$75 (Pennock, et al., 2000, 6). A Movie Stock is first offered for sale
when a movie may be nothing more than a concept, e.g. Spiderman IV. Over
time, the value of the Movie Stock fluctuates depending on many factors
including the signing of a well-known star to the project, the successful
completion of filming and the scheduling of the movie’s release in theaters.
(see, e.g. Elberse 2007).
2.2 HSX market operations
Most movies open on Friday. At 10 am (Pacific time) on the first Friday
after a movie opens in theaters, trading in a Movie Stock is halted to ensure
that no traders are able to take advantage of early box office returns. The price
at this time is known as the HALT price. This figure may be used to forecast
the four weekend box office total. The HALT price can also forecast the
opening weekend’s box office total (Pennock, et al. 2000; Spann and Skiera
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2003). [This is accomplished by dividing the HALT price by the appropriate
multiplier which is discussed next.]
On the Monday following a movie’s opening, trading is resumed (around
3 pm Pacific time). At that time, the price for a Movie Stock is adjusted using a
standard formula. The new price for the Movie Stock is set at 2.9 times the
opening weekend box office receipts. (Movies opening on days other than
Friday have a different multiplier.) Trading resumes until the Monday after
the 4th weekend of release. At this point, trading ceases as the security is
removed from the exchange. At a future date, traders receive the comparable
number of H$ for the 4 weekend total box office divided by one million for
each Movie Stock they hold in their portfolios. This price, which is equal to
the actual box office outcome, is known as the DELIST price.
Next we discuss the real money IEM Movie Box Office Market.
2.3 IEM overview
Beginning in 1988 (as the Iowa Political Stock Market), the Iowa
Electronic Market (or IEM) has been used to accurately predict a number of
national, local and international elections (Forsythe, et al., 1992; Berg, et al.,
2007). In many instances, the market’s prediction of the popular vote was
more accurate than that available from pre-election “trial heat” polls (Berg,
Forsythe and Reitz, 1997). While the best-known markets focus on the
outcomes of political elections, there are also markets to predict stock price
levels, corporate earnings, stock returns and changes in Federal Reserve
policy (see www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem for more details).
The IEM is a small-scale, real money prediction market. Traders buy and
sell futures contracts whose value is tied to a future political, economic or
business event. Trader investments in the IEM are limited to $500 and there is
no short selling allowed. Since the IEM charges no transaction fees, this is a
zero-sum market in which all investments by traders are returned to the traders
collectively.
In the IEM, trading is accomplished through a computerized anonymous
double auction mechanism. To buy a contract, a trader can execute a market
order and buy at the current best price available (lowest ask from another
trader) in the market. Alternatively, the trader can submit a limit order. This
would include an offer to buy (bid) at a higher price and a time limit on the
offer. [The analogous process can be followed to sell or offer to sell contracts.]
The limit orders (bids/asks) are queued by price and submission times. The
best prices in each queue are displayed to traders. All trading of individual
contracts and the resulting prices in the market are determined by activity
between individual traders who remain anonymous to each other.
Traders can also acquire contracts from the market in a bundle consisting
of one of each of the contracts in the market. These can be purchased from or
sold to the IEM exchange at any time for $1, the guaranteed liquidation
value (payoff at the end of the market) of the bundle. This feature of the
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market allows contract supply to expand and shrink as traders desire without
contaminating the individual contract prices as set by the traders.
2.4 IEM movie box office markets
The outcome predicted by these markets is the U.S. domestic box office
performance of a particular movie over a four-week period. For each movie,
four to six contracts were offered in the market. Each contract is associated
with a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive range of box office
receipts within the specified four-week period. At the end of the market, only
one of the contracts pays off while the others expire worthless (i.e., a set of
outcome-spanning Arrow-Debreu securities).
Since the contracts are designed to pay off $1, the corresponding market
prices of the contracts can be interpreted as an estimate of the probability of
the corresponding event occurring. If the box office receipts fall within a given
contract’s range, then the contract pays $1; all other contracts pay $0. Thus,
our structure is a winner-take-all market.
For example, in the fall 2002 market, there were 5 contracts associated
with the movie “Die Another Day.” They were defined as follows:
DIE90L $1.00 if Die Another Day’s official box office receipts for
the 11/22-12/19 period are lower than or equal to $90
million; zero otherwise.
DIE100L $1.00 if Die Another Day’s official box office receipts for
the 11/22-12/19 period are greater than $90 million and
lower than or equal to $100 million; zero otherwise.
DIE110L $1.00 if Die Another Day’s official box office receipts for
the 11/22-12/19 period are greater than $100 million and
lower than or equal to $110 million; zero otherwise.
DIE120L $1.00 if Die Another Day’s official box office receipts for
the 11/22-12/19 period are greater than $110 million and
lower than $120 million; zero otherwise.
DIE120H $1.00 if Die Another Day’s official box office receipts for
the 11/22-12/19 periodare greater than $120 million; zero
otherwise.
Trading in the IEM movie box office markets began from 4–19 days before
the opening of the movie in theaters (all but three of the movies opened on a
Friday). Traders could access the market 24-hours a day through the Internet.
Trading continued for four weeks after the opening of the movie. The contracts
were liquidated soon after when the official box office data became available.
There were a total of nineteen IEM Movie Box Office Markets organized
between 1998 and 2007. The earliest markets, offered in December 1995 to
January 1996 were omitted from this analysis due to there being no
comparable forecast since these markers predated the debut of HSX.com. We
provide an overview of these markets in Table 1.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The pool of traders for the IEM movie box office markets was limited to
participants with an academic affiliation including students, staff and faculty.
In nine of these markets, all traders were business students who were provided
a $5 or $10 trading account that they could redeem for cash after the market
liquidated (They could add more funds to the $500 market limit). In exchange,
as part of a course assignment, the students were required to submit a forecast
of the 4-week box office performance for the movie(s) that would be traded on
the IEM during the semester. The students were also required to execute at
least two trades while the market was open.
In the other markets, there was either a mix of student traders and self-
selected traders who provided their own funds for trading or all traders were
self-selected. In the markets indicated by *, all of the traders were students
who were provided funded trading accounts.
3. RESULTS OF PREDICTION MARKET COMPARISONS
The HSX forecasts were determined using the Movie Stock prices on the
night before the movies opened in theaters. These data were collected from the
HSX.com site directly (http://movies.hsx.com/exchange/market/). We used
this price rather than the HALT price since traders may have superior access
to information about a movie once it is released in theaters, i.e. traders could
actually see the movie and judge its appeal to others. For example, for three of
the movies in this study - The Fountain (2006), The Matrix (1999) and Ten
Things I Hate About You (1999) - the HALT price was determined 2 or 3 days
after the movie’s release in theaters.
3.1 Determining a point forecast from contract prices
In contrast to the single market prices of Movie Stocks at HSX.com, there
is a different price for each IEM futures contract. The prices we use to
estimate a point forecast are the normalized last transaction prices at Midnight
on the night before the movie opened in theaters.
To convert these prices into a point estimate of box office performance,
we assume that contract prices reflect a set of normally distributed point
forecasts by individual traders. Under this assumption, the resulting price of a
contract can be computed for any mean and standard deviation using the
cumulative normal distribution function. Specifically, for a given mean and
standard deviation, we can compute the Z-scores associated with the top and
the bottom of the range for a given contract. Using this data, we can compute
the difference of the cumulative normal distribution evaluated at these
Z-scores. This difference is the expected price of the particular contract for a
given mean and standard deviation.
To identify the best fitting mean and standard deviation based on observed
contract prices, we reversed the above process. We employ an iterative search of
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a positive two-dimensional space in which the first dimension corresponds to the
mean of the normal distribution while the second dimension is the standard
deviation. For each candidate mean and standard deviation, we computed the root
mean squared error (RMSE) between the observed contract prices (normalized
to sum to one) and contract prices implied by a normal distribution with the
candidate mean and standard deviation. Overall, the goal of the optimization was
to minimize the RMSE measure. We used multiple starting points for each of the
markets to reduce the chances of obtaining a local minimum solution.
We illustrate the outcome of this process in Table 2 using the contract
prices for the fall 2002 IEM box office market associated with the movie, “Die
Another Day.”
The average of RMSE’s for these computations was less than 0.03.
3.2 Comparing forecast accuracy
Note that the basis for forecasting accuracy is different for the different
markets. The HSX.com Movie Stock price is intended to predict the four-
weekend (25 day) box office total while the IEM contracts are tied to the four-
week (29 day) box office total. This means there is difference of four days’
receipts in the actual outcomes. The deviations between the actual box office
results and the prediction market forecasts are presented in Figure 1.
Across the nineteen pairs of markets, we see that the errors of the point
estimates for the two markets are usually on the same side (positive or
negative) and of comparable magnitude. The correlation between forecasting
errors of the two markets is 0.93.
To compare the accuracy of the two markets, we first analyzed the point
estimates. We computed the unbiased absolute percentage error (UAPE) for
both sets of forecasts. Following Makridakis (1993), the formula for the
UAPE is given by:
UAPE ¼ Absolute Value ðForecast–ActualÞ=Average ðForecast;ActualÞ:
TABLE 2
Forecast Implied by IEM Contract Prices
Contract (Range)
Pre-opening Price
(Normalized to sum to 1)
Prices if forecasts were
distributed , Normal
(119.69, 13.1)1
DIE90L (#$90MM) 0.04 0.01
DIE100L ($90 þ MM, $100MM) 0.06 0.05
DIE110L ($100 þ MM, $110MM) 0.13 0.16
DIE120L ($110 þ MM, $120MM) 0.28 0.28
DIE120H (.$120MM) 0.49 0.49




The UAPE measure is bounded between 0 and 200 and does not favor low
forecasts as in the case of the traditional APE measure (Collopy and
Armstrong 2000).
Based on the results of Rosenbloom and Notz (2005), we should expect
that the forecasts generated by the real money IEM movie box office market
should be significantly more accurate than those of the play money HSX since
these events - movie box office revenues - are not associated with team sports
contests. The mean UAPE for the IEM forecasts was 0.41 compared to a mean
UAPE for the HSX.com forecasts of 0.31. Using a paired comparison
t-statistic, this difference (t ¼ 1.948) is not significant (p , 0.067) for the
two-tailed test. For these markets, we find that the forecasts for the real money
market (IEM) are not significantly more accurate than for the play money
counterpart (HSX). The results from this pair of play money and real
money prediction markets do not support the earlier findings of Rosenbloom
and Notz (2005).
One potential problem with the comparison of point forecasts is the
assumption necessary to convert the contract prices in the IEM market into a
point estimate. Therefore, we examined the probabilistic forecasts generated
by each market. The probability of interest is which real money IEM contract
will pay $1 based on the movie’s performance.
For the IEM markets, we chose as our forecast the contract with the
highest price on the night before the movie’s opening. For the HSX markets,
we identified the IEM contract in which the HSX point forecast fell. For
example, in the 2002 movie Die Another Day, the Thursday night HSX
forecast was H$127 or $127 million. The corresponding IEM contract was
DIE120H. The price of that IEM contract was $0.49 on Thursday at midnight.
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FIGURE 1. Comparison of Prediction Market Accuracy.
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Comparing the market forecasts in this way, we find that both markets
identified the correct contract (paying $1) a total of 7 times. Both markets
identified the wrong contract (not always the same wrong contract) a total of
seven times. The IEM alone identified the correct contract three times and the
HSX price alone identified the correct contract twice.
We can compare the quality of the information provided by the prices of
the contracts identified by the IEM and the HSX price using a proper scoring
rule. Treating these pairs of prices as probabilities, we used the following
logarithmic scoring rule:
si ¼ ln½wi*pi þ ð1 2 wiÞð1 2 piÞ
where wi ¼ 1 if the four week box office falls within the range of the specified
contract and pi ¼ the price of that contract on the night before the movie
opens in theaters.
The average score for the HSX forecasts was20.24 and20.28 for the IEM
forecasts (closer to zero is better). These averages are not significantly different
(t ¼ 0.62, p , 0.54 for a two-tailed, paired comparison t-test). The results
suggest there is no significant difference in the information available from each
market to identify which real money contract will pay off in the IEM.
4. PLAY MONEY PREDICTION MARKET PERFORMANCE
OVER TIME
In this section, we turn to the issue of trying to better understand why the
play money HSX markets performed as well or better than the real money
IEM movie markets. As noted above, Servan-Schreiber, et al. (2004) argue
that the outcomes of real money markets can be affected by differences in
wealth between traders regardless of their ability to correctly forecast future
events. In the long run, of course, poorly informed traders will eventually lose
their investments and leave the market.
In contrast, play money markets usually endow all players with the same
initial stake of trading currency. The only way to build one’s wealth in a play
money market is through a series of correct predictions. Over time, the best
prognosticators should prosper and drive the prices in the prediction markets in
the correct direction. As time passes and more uninformed traders lose money
and drop out of the market, the predictions of a play money market should
improve since the surviving participants have proven forecasting abilities.
We tested this conjecture by examining the ability of HSX to predict the
opening weekend box office results for movies released between 1999 and
2002. Following prior research by Pennock, et al. (2000) and Spann and Skiera
(2003), we transformed the HALT price (described above) which is a forecast
of the four weekend box office total into a forecast of the opening weekend
results by dividing the HALT price by the appropriate multiplier. For movies
released on Friday, this multiplier is 2.9 (it differs for other opening days).
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We collected information about HALT prices and opening box office
performance for a total of 568 movies released between 1999 and 2002 from
hsj.org, a website for fans of the HSX.com game. This sample includes all of the
observations in the Pennock, et al. (2000) and Spann and Skiera (2003) studies.
For each movie, we computed the error using the same formula given above.
We then computed the median unbiased absolute percentage error as well as the
25th and 75th percentiles for each year. The results are presented in Table 3.
The mean UAPE does not significantly vary across the four year period
(F ¼ 2.43, df ¼ 3, p , 0.06). While there seemed to be some improvement
in forecasting accuracy between 1999 and 2000, the mean UAPE rose to
comparable levels by 2002. Therefore, contrary to our expectations, we do not
find evidence that forecasting accuracy of the play money HSX market
improves over time.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we contribute to the growing literature comparing the
relative forecasting performance of play money and real money prediction
markets. This is an important issue for the future development and
deployment of prediction market technology due to the obstacles of
organizing real money prediction markets. Comparing the point forecasts
from the play money Hollywood Stock Exchange and the real money IEM
movie box office markets, we find there to be no significant difference in their
accuracy as measured by the mean unbiased absolute percentage error for 19
movies released between 1989 and 2007. This result is not consistent with
earlier research on the relative performances of real and play money markets
for non-sports events by Rosenbloom and Notz (2005). We also test the
implications of a conjecture by Servan-Schreiber, et al. (2004) who claim that,
over time, play money prediction markets may yield superior forecasts since
the prices in the market would reflect the opinions of successful, surviving
traders. Examining the ability of the play money Hollywood Stock Exchange
to forecast the first weekend’s box office results, we find no statistical
differences across the years 1999 to 2002.
TABLE 3
HSX Forecasts of Opening Weekend Results using HALT Prices
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mean UAPE .374 .295 .331 .363
Std. Dev. UAPE .287 .233 .264 .287
75%ile UAPE .528 .419 .481 .504
Median UAPE .339 .273 .267 .363
25%ile UAPE .143 .113 .121 .141
Observations 137 140 134 156
Data source: www.HSJ.org
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There are some important limitations that should be considered in
interpreting the results of the comparison between the play money HSX and
the real money IEM. The traders in the real money prediction markets for
non-sports events studied by Rosenbloom and Notz (2005) were clients of
Tradesports.com. Presumably, these traders were self-selected and were
risking their own money in the prediction markets. The participants in IEM
movie markets were generally a mixture of the self-selected traders and
students who were provided the money to trade. The students trading with
“house money” may have been more risk seeking in their trading (Ackert, et al.
2006). The presence of these risk-seeking traders may have made the resulting
market prices less efficient, leading to less accurate forecasts. In addition, the
design of the IEM contracts – paying either $1 or $0 depending on the
outcome – may have encouraged more risky trading in general.
More research is needed to determine whether real money prediction
markets wherein the organizers provide funding work as well as those with
self-selected traders. Providing traders with funds with which to participate is
one possible option that prediction market organizers might employ to avoid
complications inherent in real money markets with self-selected traders drawn
from the public at large. In addition, markets run for the internal benefit of a
given company are likely to have funded traders as in Chen and Plott (2001)
than require participants to risk their own money.
A second limitation involves the trading population for the IEM movie
box office markets as a whole. Due to restrictions on the types of participants
allowed, these markets were not open to the general public. In contrast, the
non-sports markets studied by Rosenbloom and Notz (2005) did not have such
restrictions. It is entirely possible that traders with superior information about
the box office success of various movies were unable to profit from their
superior knowledge due to this restriction on participation in the real money
IEM markets. While a better informed individual faces no barrier to
participating in the HSX markets, it is not clear whether the intrinsic rewards
offered by that play money market are sufficient to motivate participation by
truly knowledgeable traders.
The inability of traders in the real money IEM movie box office market to
improve on the forecasting performance of the play money HSX raises an
interesting issue regarding the role of monetary incentives in prediction
markets. Much of the research on monetary incentives and performance is
focused on experiments in which a participant’s success is governed in large
part by his or her efforts regarding some task (see, for example, Smith and
Walker 1993). It may be true that the traders in the real money IEM movie box
office market expended a great deal of effort in their participation in the
markets. However, superior financial performance by a trader and, by
extension, superior forecasting performance by a market, may have more to do
with better information than increased effort.
Interestingly, the winner-take-all design of the IEM contracts would lead
to traders with valuable information to benefit handsomely especially when
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that information is rare. Consider the case that a consensus of trader opinion
holds that the movie’s four week total would lead to a given contract paying
$1. For example, the consensus of opinion (based on a price of $0.87)
suggested that the movie Tears of the Sun (2003) would earn more than $60
million in its first four weeks of release. A trader with superior knowledge of
the true outcome of actual outcome of $41 million could have purchased
the associated contract for about $0.03 the night before the movie opened
in theaters. An interesting area for future research would be to measure
individual trader’s information before a prediction market to determine under
what circumstances traders benefit from superior information.
Turning to our analysis of the predictive accuracy of the HSX forecasts
over time, the results are really not surprising. Over the time period we
studied, the number of registered traders increased dramatically. In 1999, the
Hollywood Stock Exchange boasted of 350,000 traders (Braunstein 1999).
This number grew to more than 1 million by May, 2003. The addition of
new traders, especially those with worse information, is of great benefit to
experienced and better informed traders. The newly arrived “noise traders”
provide liquidity in the prediction market that allows the better informed
participants to profit from their knowledge. However, this increased liquidity
may be benefiting some traders at the cost to reduced accuracy for the market
as a whole. The influx of these new, inexperienced traders may be affecting
the ability of better informed survivors to move market prices in the direction
of an accurate forecast. Therefore, organizers of play money markets seeking
to improve forecasting accuracy over time will have to find a balance between
keeping participation rewarding for better informed traders through adding
new traders and taking advantage of the superior knowledge concentrated in
long-run survivors.
In conclusion, this study suggests that the presence of monetary incentives
on their own does not lead to better forecasts of movie box office performance
than those produced by a play money counterpart. However, as impressive
as are the results from the play money HSX market, the market’s overall
performance did not improve substantially between 1999 and 2002. This
suggests the drive to add new participants may have increased market liquidity
at the expense of improved forecasting accuracy.
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